Static analysis of xml security views and query rewriting

Autor: Yves Roos, Benoît Groz, Anne-Cécile Caron, Sophie Tison, Sławomir Staworko
Přispěvatelé: Department of Computer Science [Haifa], University of Haifa [Haifa], Linking Dynamic Data (LINKS ), Laboratoire d'Informatique Fondamentale de Lille (LIFL), Université de Lille, Sciences et Technologies-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Université de Lille, Sciences Humaines et Sociales-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lille, Sciences et Technologies-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Université de Lille, Sciences Humaines et Sociales-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Inria Lille - Nord Europe, Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria), Université de Lille, Sciences et Technologies-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Université de Lille, Sciences Humaines et Sociales-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), This work is partially supported by the INRIA collaboration program (Actions de Recherches Collaboratives de l’INRIA).
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2014
Předmět:
Zdroj: Information and Computation
Information and Computation, Elsevier, 2014, 238, pp.2-29. ⟨10.1016/j.ic.2014.07.003⟩
HAL
Information and Computation, 2014, 238, pp.2-29. ⟨10.1016/j.ic.2014.07.003⟩
Groz, B, Staworko, S, Caron, A-C, Roos, Y & Tison, S 2014, ' Static analysis of XML security views and query rewriting ', Information and Computation, vol. 238, pp. 2-29 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ic.2014.07.003
ISSN: 0890-5401
1090-2651
DOI: 10.1016/j.ic.2014.07.003⟩
Popis: International audience; In this paper, we revisit the view based security framework for XML without imposing any of the previously considered restrictions on the class of queries, the class of DTDs, and the type of annotations used to define the view. First, we study {\em query rewriting} with views when the classes used to define queries and views are Regular XPath and MSO. Next, we investigate problems of {\em static analysis} of security access specifications (SAS): we introduce the novel class of \emph{interval-bounded} SAS and we define three different manners to compare views (i.e. queries), with a security point of view. We provide a systematic study of the complexity for deciding these three comparisons, when the depth of the XML documents is bounded, when the document may have an arbitrary depth but the queries defining the views are restricted to guarantee the interval-bounded property, and in the general setting without restriction on queries and document.
Databáze: OpenAIRE