The Uncovered Set and the Core: Cox's Result Revisited
| Autor: | Victoria Brosi, Anindya Bhattacharya, Francesco Ciardiello |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
Singleton
media_common.quotation_subject lcsh:Economic theory. Demography uncovered set core Condorcet method Spatial voting games Coincidence lcsh:Political institutions and public administration (General) lcsh:HB1-3840 Core (game theory) If and only if Voting Contradiction lcsh:JF20-2112 Set (psychology) Mathematical economics media_common Mathematics |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Vol 3, Iss 1, Pp 1-15 (2018) |
| ISSN: | 2399-8458 2399-844X |
| DOI: | 10.22574/jmid.2018.12.001 |
| Popis: | In this work first it is shown, in contradiction to the well-known claim in Cox\ud (1987), that the uncovered set in a multidimensional spatial voting situation\ud (under the usual regularity conditions) does not necessarily coincide with the\ud core even when the core is singleton: in particular, the posited coincidence\ud result, while true for an odd number of voters, may cease to be true when the\ud number of voters is even. Second we provide a characterisation result for the\ud case with an even number of voters: a singleton core is the uncovered set in\ud this case if and only if the unique element in the core is the Condorcet winner. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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