Reputation and the 'need for enemies'
| Autor: | Maxime Menuet, Patrick Villieu |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International (CERDI), Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I (UdA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Laboratoire d'économie d'Orleans (LEO), Université d'Orléans (UO)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Laboratoire d'économie d'Orleans [2008-2011] (LEO) |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information Knowledge and Uncertainty media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Adversary [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance Microeconomics Politics Incentive If and only if 0502 economics and business Human multitasking Business 050207 economics Competence (human resources) ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS 050205 econometrics Reputation media_common Public finance |
| Zdroj: | Economic Theory Economic Theory, Springer Verlag, 2020, ⟨10.1007/s00199-020-01289-7⟩ Economic Theory, 2020, ⟨10.1007/s00199-020-01289-7⟩ |
| ISSN: | 1432-0479 0938-2259 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00199-020-01289-7 |
| Popis: | A reputation of competence in solving a particular problem is useful only if the problem remains in the future. Hence, there is an incentive to keep the “enemy” alive: An agent may do wrong in his or her job precisely because he or she is competent. The paper develops this mechanism in a general career concerns framework and shows that a tradeoff between reputation and the need for enemies emerges. As a result, agents are induced to produce only moderate effort, and only moderately skilled agents are likely to be appointed. Implications of the analysis are discussed in a multitasking environment with incomplete transparency. Some evidence in principal–agent relationships and the political arena is presented to illustrate our theory. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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