How do supranational regulators keep companies in line?
Autor: | Rik Joosen, Asya Zhelyazkova |
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Přispěvatelé: | Public Administration, Sociology |
Jazyk: | angličtina |
Rok vydání: | 2022 |
Předmět: | |
Zdroj: | Journal of Common Market Studies, 60(4), 983-1000. Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd Journal of Common Market Studies, 60(4), 983-1000. WILEY |
ISSN: | 0021-9886 |
Popis: | National governments have increasingly transferred enforcement powers to EU agencies that monitor and penalize non-compliance by private actors. How do EU agencies apply enforcement competences in practice? Based on the Eurolegalism thesis, pressures for deeper integration have led to the emergence of a more adversarial enforcement style in Europe. Consequently, supranational regulators are expected to employ formal and coercive enforcement instruments. Conversely, studies of EU enforcement suggest that EU agencies may be reluctant to antagonize national governments by prosecuting private actors. In this study, we analyze the enforcement practices of supranational agencies with direct enforcement powers: the EU Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and European Medicines Agency (EMA). We find that EU agencies apply a legalistic approach, but they vary in coerciveness of enforcement. Whereas EU agencies tend to apply more coercive measures against non-conform products, they are generally not adversarial toward non-compliant organizations. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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