Collateral and asymmetric information in lending markets

Autor:	Vasso Ioannidou, Nicola Pavanini, Yushi Peng
Přispěvatelé:	Research Group: Finance, Department of Finance
Jazyk:	angličtina
Rok vydání:	2022
Předmět:	credit markets Economics and Econometrics asymmetric information Strategy and Management Accounting education collateral Finance humanities health care economics and organizations structural estimation
Zdroj:	Journal of Financial Economics, 144(1), 93-121. Elsevier Science
ISSN:	1879-2774 0304-405X
Popis:	We study the benefits and costs of collateral requirements in bank lending markets with asymmetric information. We estimate a structural model of firms' credit demand for secured and unsecured loans, banks' contract offering and pricing, and firm default using credit registry data in a setting where asymmetric information problems are pervasive. We provide evidence that collateral mitigates adverse selection and moral hazard. With counterfactual experiments, we quantify how an adverse shock to collateral values propagates to credit supply, credit allocation, interest rates, default, bank profits, and document the relative importance of banks' pricing and rationing in response to this shock.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::cb59bd95bd608abac8ac0ad42f60f26e https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/d861707f-9f0f-43c7-9f76-9ce746948461 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full Text from ScienceDirect