Maya: Using Formal Control to Obfuscate Power Side Channels
| Autor: | Josep Torrellas, Petros G. Voulgaris, Alexander G. Schwing, Raghavendra Pradyumna Pothukuchi, Sweta Yamini Pothukuchi |
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| Rok vydání: | 2022 |
| Předmět: |
business.industry
Computer science Firmware media_common.quotation_subject SIGNAL (programming language) computer.software_genre Software Software deployment Control theory Hardware and Architecture Embedded system Obfuscation Side channel attack Electrical and Electronic Engineering Function (engineering) business computer media_common |
| Zdroj: | ISCA |
| ISSN: | 1937-4143 0272-1732 |
| DOI: | 10.1109/mm.2022.3166886 |
| Popis: | The security of computers is at risk because of information leaking through their power consumption. Attackers can use advanced signal measurement and analysis to recover sensitive data from this side channel. To address this problem, this paper presents Maya, a simple and effective defense against power side channels. The idea is to use formal control to re-shape the power dissipated by a computer in an application-transparent manner---preventing attackers from learning any information about the applications that are running. With formal control, a controller can reliably keep power close to a desired target function even when runtime conditions change unpredictably. By selecting the target function intelligently, the controller can make power to follow any desired shape, appearing to carry activity information which, in reality, is unrelated to the application. Maya can be implemented in privileged software, firmware, or simple hardware. In this paper, we implement Maya on three machines using privileged threads only, and show its effectiveness and ease of deployment. Maya has already thwarted a newly-developed remote power attack. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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