Diversification, Common Ownership, and Strategic Incentives

Autor:	Jo Seldeslachts, Xavier Vives, Albert Banal-Estañol
Rok vydání:	2020
Předmět:	Product market Investment strategy 05 social sciences Diversification (finance) Common ownership General Medicine Monetary economics Venture capital Profit (economics) Incentive 0502 economics and business Goodwill Business 050207 economics 050205 econometrics
Zdroj:	AEA Papers and Proceedings
ISSN:	2574-0776 2574-0768
DOI:	10.1257/pandp.20201026
Popis:	We argue that within-industry investor diversification is directly related to common ownership incentives (profit loads on rival firms by the manager of a firm) in product markets. Because of their respective investment strategies, passive investors are naturally more diversified than active investors. If more money flows from active toward passive investors, then common ownership incentives increase. The opposite occurs if active investors receive more money flows. This pattern is shown in two example US industries for the period 2004-2012.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c5fdce9a24bf44e8a2dd86e86fba64b3 https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20201026 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF