The Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism: Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party Politics in Corporate Governance Reform
| Autor: | Martin Höpner, John W. Cioffi |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2006 |
| Předmět: |
Sociology and Political Science
Political Science corporate governance Policy and Administration Political Science & Public Administration 050601 international relations Political sociology Politics Market economy finance capitalism Finance capitalism economic reform 050602 political science & public administration Economics Legitimacy Peace center-left parties Corporate governance 05 social sciences Stakeholder Justice and Strong Institutions 0506 political science Managerialism Political system Political Science and International Relations financial regulation Social Sciences (miscellaneous) |
| Zdroj: | Politics & Society Politics & Society, vol 34, iss 4 |
| ISSN: | 1552-7514 0032-3292 |
| DOI: | 10.1177/0032329206293642 |
| Popis: | A striking paradox underlies corporate governance reform during the past fifteen years: center-left political parties have pushed for pro-shareholder corporate governance reforms, while the historically pro-business right has generally resisted them to protect established forms of organized capitalism, concentrated corporate stock ownership, and managerialism. Case studies of Germany, France, Italy, and the United States reveal that center-left parties used corporate governance reform to attack the legitimacy of existing political economic elites, present themselves as pro-growth and pro-modernization, strike political alliances with segments of the financial sector, and appeal to middle-class voters. Conservative parties' established alliances with managers constrained them from endorsing corporate governance reform. © 2006 Sage Publications. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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