Evolutionary Game-theoretic Analysis for Residential Users Considering Integrated Demand Response
| Autor: | Xiaofeng Liu, Bingtuan Gao, Chen Chen, Yanhui Qin, Zhenyu Zhu |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
TK1001-1841
Computer science 020209 energy Stability (learning theory) TJ807-830 Energy Engineering and Power Technology 02 engineering and technology Contract price computer.software_genre Renewable energy sources energy consumption behavior News aggregator Microeconomics Demand response Production of electric energy or power. Powerplants. Central stations 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Energy supply Building automation evolutionary game Renewable Energy Sustainability and the Environment business.industry 020208 electrical & electronic engineering integrated demand response (IDR) intelligent community Incentive business computer Efficient energy use |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy, Vol 9, Iss 6, Pp 1500-1509 (2021) |
| ISSN: | 2196-5625 |
| DOI: | 10.35833/mpce.2019.000030 |
| Popis: | As an important part of demand side, residential users have the characteristics of imperfect rationality and strong randomness, which are rarely considered in the existing study. Moreover, to effectively improve the energy efficiency, integrated demand response (IDR) is proposed as an effective measure to reduce the local energy supply pressure. This paper focuses on a scenario for IDR programs, in which the intelligent building aggregator (IBA) wants to encourage residential users to participate in IDR according to a proper contract price policy. To analyze how the participation degree tendency evolves over time, an evolutionary game approach is proposed considering residential users' bounded-rationality. A symmetric evolutionary game model and an asymmetric evolutionary game model are established, and the stability of equilibrium points in the above models is proven. Simulation results show that different contract price policies will obviously influence residential users' strategy, and affect the stable equilibrium points of the evolutionary game. The simulation results provide an effective reference for IBA to set proper and effective price incentives. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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