Strategic information transmission with sender's approval

Autor: Françoise Forges, Jérôme Renault
Přispěvatelé: Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine (LEDa), Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD)-Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL), Toulouse School of Economics (TSE-R), Université Toulouse Capitole (UT Capitole), Université de Toulouse (UT)-Université de Toulouse (UT)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université de Toulouse (UT), PNRIA, ANR-19-P3IA-0004,ANITI,Artificial and Natural Intelligence Toulouse Institute(2019), ANR-17-EURE-0010,CHESS,Toulouse Graduate School défis en économie et sciences sociales quantitatives(2017), ANR-19-CE23-0017,MaSDOL,Mathématiques de l'optimisation déterministe et stochastique liées à l'apprentissage profond(2019), Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD)-Université Paris Dauphine-PSL-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Toulouse 1 Capitole (UT1), Université Toulouse 1 Capitole (UT1), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD)-Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL), Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées, Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées, Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2021
Předmět:
Statistics and Probability
Economics and Econometrics
Computer science
Existential quantification
[SHS.INFO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Library and information sciences
Data_CODINGANDINFORMATIONTHEORY
JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C78 - Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory
Type (model theory)
Mathematics (miscellaneous)
Strategy
Cheap talk
Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory
0502 economics and business
Communication source
050207 economics
Mathematics - Optimization and Control
B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
050205 econometrics
Approval
Cheap talk
Sender–receiver game
Participation constraints
Focus (computing)
D.D8.D82
05 social sciences
ComputerSystemsOrganization_COMPUTER-COMMUNICATIONNETWORKS
Construct (python library)
[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games
[MATH.MATH-OC]Mathematics [math]/Optimization and Control [math.OC]
Statistics
Probability and Uncertainty
Mathematical economics
Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Participation constraint
Zdroj: International Journal of Game Theory
International Journal of Game Theory, In press, 50 (2), ⟨10.1007/s00182-021-00757-1⟩
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer Verlag, In press, 50 (2), ⟨10.1007/s00182-021-00757-1⟩
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer Verlag, In press, ⟨10.1007/s00182-021-00757-1⟩
ISSN: 0020-7276
1432-1270
Popis: We consider sender–receiver games in which the sender has finitely many types and the receiver makes a decision in a compact set. The new feature is that, after the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject in favor of an outside option. We focus on situations in which the sender’s approval is absolutely crucial to the receiver, namely, on equilibria in which the sender does not exit at the approval stage. A nonrevealing equilibrium without exit may not exist. Our main results are that if the sender has only two types or if the receiver’s preferences over decisions do not depend on the type of the sender, there exists a (perfect Bayesian Nash) partitional equilibrium without exit, in which the sender transmits information by means of a pure strategy. The previous existence results do not extend: we construct a counter-example (with three types for the sender and type-dependent utility functions) in which there is no equilibrium without exit, even if the sender can randomize over messages. We establish additional existence results for (possibly mediated) equilibria without exit in the three type case.
Databáze: OpenAIRE
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