Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing
| Autor: | Saeed Alaei, Rad Niazadeh, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Jason D. Hartline, Yang Yuan |
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| Rok vydání: | 2015 |
| Předmět: |
FOS: Computer and information sciences
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS Economics and Econometrics Simultaneity Auction theory Electronic mail Corollary Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory 0502 economics and business Computer Science - Data Structures and Algorithms Economics Revenue Common value auction Data Structures and Algorithms (cs.DS) 050207 economics Mathematics Mechanism design Ex-ante 05 social sciences TheoryofComputation_GENERAL Vickrey auction 050206 economic theory Relaxation (approximation) Algorithmic game theory Mathematical economics Finance Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) |
| Zdroj: | FOCS |
| DOI: | 10.1109/focs.2015.92 |
| Popis: | For selling a single item to agents with independent but non-identically distributed values, the revenue optimal auction is complex. With respect to it, Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) showed that the approximation factor of the second-price auction with an anonymous reserve is between two and four. We consider the more demanding problem of approximating the revenue of the ex ante relaxation of the auction problem by posting an anonymous price (while supplies last) and prove that their worst-case ratio is e. As a corollary, the upper-bound of anonymous pricing or anonymous reserves versus the optimal auction improves from four to $e$. We conclude that, up to an $e$ factor, discrimination and simultaneity are unimportant for driving revenue in single-item auctions. 19 pages, 6 figures, To appear in 56th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2015) |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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