An Argument for Treating Children as a ‘Special Case’
| Autor: | Lucinda Ferguson |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Brake, E, Ferguson, L |
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
media_common.quotation_subject
05 social sciences Vulnerability Deference 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion Best interests Social constructionism 0506 political science Argument Premise 050602 political science & public administration 060301 applied ethics Sociology Special case Autonomy media_common Law and economics |
| Zdroj: | Oxford Scholarship |
| DOI: | 10.1093/oso/9780198786429.003.0012 |
| Popis: | This chapter’s argument stems from the premise that legal language should speak for itself. The ‘paramountcy’ principle suggests the prioritisation of children’s interests, and ‘children’s rights’ suggests some aspect of distinctiveness to children’s interests. But there is academic consensus in respect of both that children’s interests cannot and should not be prioritised over those of others. This chapter examines the justification for the contrary perspective, and for treating children as a prioritised ‘special case’ in all legal decisions affecting them. Four key counter-arguments frame the discussion. First, the ‘social construct’ objection: as a social construct, childhood cannot sustain the prioritisation of children’s interests over those of others. Second, the ‘vulnerability’ objection: children’s vulnerability is either not unique or suggests dependency or interdependency, not prioritisation. Third, the ‘family autonomy’ objection: parents’ rights and the family unit justify deference of children’s interests. Fourth, the ‘equality’ objection: equal moral consideration makes prioritisation unjustifiable. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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