The Probability to Reach an Agreement as a Foundation for Axiomatic Bargaining
| Autor: | Marco LiCalzi, Lorenzo Bastianello |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
Economics and Econometrics Bargaining problem Settore SECS-S/06 - Metodi mat. dell'economia e Scienze Attuariali e Finanziarie copulas cooperative bargaining mediation arbitration benchmarking copulas Computer science media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Foundation (evidence) Characterization (mathematics) Agreement Interpretation (model theory) Product (mathematics) 0502 economics and business cooperative bargaining mediation Operator product expansion benchmarking 050207 economics Mathematical economics Axiom arbitration 050205 econometrics media_common |
| Zdroj: | Econometrica |
| ISSN: | 0012-9682 |
| DOI: | 10.3982/ecta13673 |
| Popis: | We revisit the Nash bargaining model and axiomatize a procedural solution that maximizes the probability of successful bargaining. Our characterization spans several known solution concepts, including the special cases of the Nash, egalitarian, and utilitarian solutions. Using a probability‐based language, we offer a natural interpretation for the product operator underlying the Nash solution: when the bargainers' individual acceptance probabilities are independent, their product recovers the joint acceptance probability. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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