Tax Evasion, Corruption and Market Entry
| Autor: | Marcel Thum, André Seidel |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2015 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Double taxation Steuerpolitik Markteintritt Korruption Steuerhinterziehung Besteuerung 050208 finance Sociology and Political Science Public economics Direct tax 05 social sciences Monetary economics Tax reform International taxation Value-added tax Tax credit Ad valorem tax ddc:320 0502 economics and business ddc:330 Economics Tax policy Market entry Corruption Tax evasion Enforcement 050207 economics Indirect tax |
| Zdroj: | Scottish Journal of Political Economy. 63:377-398 |
| ISSN: | 0036-9292 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/sjpe.12100 |
| Popis: | We analyze the impact of tax policy on the market entry of firms in the presence of corruption and tax evasion. In a world with corruption, firms must bribe corrupt officials to enter the market. For a given level of bribes, higher tax rates and stricter enforcement of taxation decrease tax evasion but typically reduce market entry. However, when the level of bribes reacts to tax policy, higher taxes and stricter enforcement of taxation can have a double benefit. Up to a certain threshold, for which we develop a simple rule, stricter enforcement increases market entry and reduces tax evasion. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|