A game theoretical analysis of the design options of the real-time electricity market
| Autor: | Vincent Rious, Haikel Khalfallah |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | équipe EDDEN, Pacte, Laboratoire de sciences sociales (PACTE), Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 (UPMF)-Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble 1 (UJF)-Sciences Po Grenoble - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble (IEPG)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 (UPMF)-Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble 1 (UJF)-Sciences Po Grenoble - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble (IEPG)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Microeconomix, Revel, Danièle |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2013 |
| Předmět: |
Factor market
Economics and Econometrics Electricity markets Environmental Engineering 020209 energy 0211 other engineering and technologies Electricity markets balancing mechanisms supply function equilibrium mixed complementarity problem 02 engineering and technology Microeconomics Oligopoly Competition (economics) 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Economics Electricity market Market power [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance Industrial organization balancing mechanisms 021103 operations research mixed complementarity problem Market microstructure [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance supply function equilibrium JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q4 - Energy General Energy JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory Forward market Mixed complementarity problem JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C6 - Mathematical Methods • Programming Models • Mathematical and Simulation Modeling |
| Zdroj: | Energy Studies Review Energy Studies Review, DeGroote School of Business, McMaster University, 2013, 20 (1), pp.34-64 |
| ISSN: | 0843-4379 |
| Popis: | Cahier de recherche EDDEN, n°4/2013, 30 p.; International audience; In this paper we study the economic consequences of two real-time electricity market designs (with or without penalties) taking into account the opportunistic behaviors of market players. We implement a two-stage dynamic model to consider the interaction between the forward market and the real-time market where market players compete in a Nash manner and rely on supply/demand function oligopoly competition. Dynamic programming is used to deal with the stochastic environment of the market and the mixed complementarity problem is employed to find a solution to the game. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate how the optimal competitor's strategies could change according to the adoption or no adoption of a balancing mechanism and to the level of the penalty imposed on imbalances, regarding a variety of producers' cost structures. The main finding of this study is that implementing balancing mechanisms would increase forward contracts while raising electricity prices. Moreover, possible use of market power would not be reduced when imbalances are penalized. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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