Does risk matter in CEO compensation contracting? Evidence from US restaurant industry
| Autor: | Arun Upneja, Murat Kizildag, Ozgur Ozdemir |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Özyeğin University, Özdemir, Özgür |
| Rok vydání: | 2013 |
| Předmět: |
CEO
Executive compensation ComputingMilieux_THECOMPUTINGPROFESSION Strategy and Management Compensation (psychology) Restaurant industry ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING Sample (statistics) Firm risk Incentive Order (exchange) Tourism Leisure and Hospitality Management Systematic risk Remuneration Business Marketing Compensation Research question |
| Zdroj: | International Journal of Hospitality Management. 34:372-383 |
| ISSN: | 0278-4319 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.ijhm.2012.11.012 |
| Popis: | The structure of compensation packages of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) has been a significant research interest for researchers across various disciplines. In this paper, we examine a unique relationship between CEO compensation and risk (systematic risk) in the US restaurant industry. Our research question stems from the assumption that CEOs must be rewarded with a higher incentive-based compensation in high-risk profile restaurant companies in order to motivate them to perform in their full potential for mutual benefits of the CEO and shareowners. Furthermore, we investigate whether firm risk moderates the relationship between firm performance and CEO total compensation controlling for the firm size and CEO ownership. We draw our sample firms from the US restaurant industry. Findings of our study suggest that firm risk induces a higher proportion of incentive-based compensation for restaurant companies’ CEOs, and firm risk does not seem to moderate the relationship between pay and performance in the restaurant industry. post-print |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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