Convergence in games with continua of equilibria
| Autor: | Mathieu Faure, Sebastian Bervoets |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques (AMSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), This work was supported by French National Research Agency Grants ANR-17-EURE-0020. Mathieu Faure gratefully acknowledges the support of the French National Research Agency, under grant ANR CIGNE (ANR-15-CE38-0007-01)., ANR-17-EURE-0020,AMSE (EUR),Aix-Marseille School of Economics(2017), ANR-15-CE38-0007,CIGNE,Communication et Information dans des Jeux dans des Réseaux(2015) |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
Economics and Econometrics Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory Dynamical systems theory Computer science Continuum (topology) Applied Mathematics 05 social sciences TheoryofComputation_GENERAL Public good [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance Set (abstract data type) symbols.namesake Nash equilibrium Best response 0502 economics and business Convergence (routing) symbols Continua of Nash equilibria 050207 economics Convergence Mathematical economics Game theory Best-response dynamics 050205 econometrics |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Mathematical Economics Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, 2020, 90, pp.25-30. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.006⟩ Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2020, 90, pp.25-30. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.006⟩ |
| ISSN: | 0304-4068 |
| Popis: | International audience; In game theory, the question of convergence of dynamical systems to the set of Nash equilibria has often been tackled. When the game admits a continuum of Nash equilibria, however, a natural and challenging question is whether convergence to the set of Nash equilibria implies convergence to a Nash equilibrium. In this paper we introduce a technique developed in Bhat and Bernstein (2003) as a useful way to answer this question. We illustrate it with the best-response dynamics in the local public good game played on a network, where continua of Nash equilibria often appear. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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