Autor:	Yuanzhu Lu, Sougata Poddar
Rok vydání:	2014
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics Salop Model Hotelling Model Costs Innovation PAtent Licensing jel:L13 Economics Tariff jel:D45 jel:D43 Patent licensing Industrial organization Insider Simple (philosophy)
Zdroj:	Economic Modelling. 42:250-256
ISSN:	0264-9993
DOI:	10.1016/j.econmod.2014.06.016
Popis:	We show that a two-part tariff licensing contract is always optimal to the insider patentee in spatial models irrespective of the size of the innovation or any pre-innovation cost asymmetries. The result provides a simple justification of the prevalence of two-part tariff licensing contracts in industries.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::bf4d437429b756b8ebf6ef36b962fa85 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2014.06.016 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full Text from ScienceDirect