Critical Thinking, Bias and Feminist Philosophy: Building a Better Framework through Collaboration
| Autor: | Maree Davies, Patrick Girard, Adam Dalgleish |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
feminism
Argumentative Social Sciences and Humanities Logic Feminist philosophy Critical pedagogy Feminism Argumentation theory 050602 political science & public administration Sociology critical thinking lcsh:BC1-199 Impossibility BC1-199 dispositional pedagogy 05 social sciences 050301 education lcsh:Logic 0506 political science Epistemology Philosophy Framing (social sciences) Critical thinking Sciences Humaines et Sociales 0503 education critical pedagogy critical thinking feminism critical pedagogy dispositional pedagogy |
| Zdroj: | Informal Logic, Vol 37, Iss 4 (2017) Informal Logic, Vol 37, Iss 4, Pp 351-369 (2017) |
| ISSN: | 0824-2577 |
| Popis: | In the late 20th century theorists within the radical feminist tradition such as Haraway (1988) highlighted the impossibility of separating knowledge from knowers, grounding firmly the idea that embodied bias can and does make its way into argument. Along a similar vein, Moulton (1983) exposed a gendered theme within critical thinking that casts the feminine as toxic ‘unreason’ and the ideal knower as distinctly masculine; framing critical thinking as a method of masculine knowers fighting off feminine ‘unreason’. Theorists such as Burrow (2010) have picked up upon this tradition, exploring the ways in which this theme of overly masculine, or ‘adversarial’, argumentation is both unnecessary and serves as an ineffective base for obtaining truth. Rooney (2010) further highlighted how this unnecessarily gendered context results in argumentative double binds for women, undermining their authority and stifling much-needed diversity within philosophy as a discipline. These are damning charges that warrant a response within critical thinking frameworks. We suggest that the broader critical thinking literature, primarily that found within contexts of critical pedagogy and dispositional schools, can and should be harnessed within the critical thinking literature to bridge the gap between classical and feminist thinkers. We highlight several methods by which philosophy can retain the functionality of critical thinking while mitigating the obstacles presented by feminist critics and highlight how the adoption of such methods not only improves critical thinking, but is also beneficial to philosophy, philosophers and feminists alike. Les philosophes cherchent souvent la vérité à travers les méthodes enseignées sous la bannière de la «Pensée critique». Pour la plupart, une variation de cette méthode est utilisée pour organiser les pensées et éliminer la subjectivité et les préjugés. Les philosophes féministes ont mis en relief un ensemble critique de lacunes au sein de ces méthodes, mais ces lacunes n’ont toutefois pas encore été entièrement abordées. Dans cet article, nous examinons ces critiques et explorons comment elles peuvent être atténuées en intégrant des éléments tirés de la pédagogie critique et des réflexions sur les dispositions qui oriente l’application des habiletés de la pensée critique. Le résultat est un ensemble de recommandations pour améliorer les méthodes de la pensée critique qui tiennent mieux compte des biais contextualisés tout en poursuivant plus précisément la vérité. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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