Public-private partnerships as a policy response to climate change

Autor: Anne Stenger, Marco Buso
Přispěvatelé: Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), AgroParisTech, Interdept Ctr Giorgio Levi Cases, CRIEP Interuniv Res Ctr Publ Econ, Universitad de Padua, ANR Forwind, Université de Lorraine (UL)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Universita degli Studi di Padova
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2018
Předmět:
020209 energy
[SDV]Life Sciences [q-bio]
Vulnerability
02 engineering and technology
010501 environmental sciences
Management
Monitoring
Policy and Law
01 natural sciences
7. Clean energy
Adaptation
Climate change
Energy efficiency
Public-private partnership
JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C6 - Mathematical Methods • Programming Models • Mathematical and Simulation Modeling/C.C6.C61 - Optimization Techniques • Programming Models • Dynamic Analysis
0202 electrical engineering
electronic engineering
information engineering
Settore SECS-P/03 - SCIENZA DELLE FINANZE
Empirical evidence
0105 earth and related environmental sciences
Bargaining problem
Public economics
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information
Knowledge
and Uncertainty/D.D8.D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information
Knowledge
and Uncertainty/D.D8.D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Subsidy
JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q54 - Climate • Natural Disasters and Their Management • Global Warming
[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
Investment (macroeconomics)
JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H1 - Structure and Scope of Government/H.H1.H11 - Structure
Scope
and Performance of Government
Public–private partnership
General Energy
Bargaining power
13. Climate action
Business
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information
Knowledge
and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
Efficient energy use
Zdroj: Energy Policy
Energy Policy, Elsevier, 2018, 119, pp.487-494. ⟨10.1016/j.enpol.2018.04.063⟩
ISSN: 0301-4215
DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2018.04.063⟩
Popis: The negative impacts of climate change on the environment and economic activities are increasingly obvious and relevant. Private response to this threat often proves to be inadequate. For example, empirical evidence reveals a sub-optimal investment by firms in energy efficiency projects capable of reducing energy costs and CO2 emissions, as well as adaptation projects able to reduce the vulnerability of the ecosystem. On the other hand, past public programs that provided financial subsidies to the above-mentioned projects have proven to be not particularly cost-effective or able to enhance final performances. In this paper, as an alternative to public subsidies, we propose and assess the opportunity to implement Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) where the public regulator plays a more active role in the investment choice. Precisely, we model the decision-making process through a Nash bargaining procedure between public and private actors. We end up with two main results: (i) compared to public subsidies, the use of PPPs leads to higher outcomes/performances and allows governments to overcome incompleteness in contracts; (ii) PPPs are optimally chosen only when there is a fair allocation of the bargaining power between the two sides and when bargaining procedures are not perceived as being too lengthy or costly.
Databáze: OpenAIRE
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