| Autor: |
Lambertini, Luca |
| Jazyk: |
angličtina |
| Rok vydání: |
2006 |
| Předmět: |
|
| Zdroj: |
Lambertini, Luca (2006) Is America Unrivaled? A Repeated Game Analysis. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 21. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4724 . In: Quaderni-Working Paper DSE (563). ISSN 2282-6483. |
| DOI: |
10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4724 |
| Popis: |
I use a strategic setup to investigate whether unipolarism can indeed persist as a long run equilibrium. In a three-country world, a global power may subsidise two satellites so as to incentivate them not to invest to build up a coalition against it. I single out the conditions under which the one-shot game is a Prisoners’ Dilemma where no subsidy is paid and the coalition arises at equilibrium. Then, I revert to the infinitely repeated game and apply the Perfect Folk Theorem to characterise the critical thresholds of discount factor sustaining unipolarism at the subgame perfect equilibrium. |
| Databáze: |
OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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