The Logit-Response Dynamics
| Autor: | Nick Netzer, Carlos Alós-Ferrer |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | University of Zurich, Alós-Ferrer, Carlos |
| Rok vydání: | 2008 |
| Předmět: |
logit-response dynamics
Learning in games logit-response dynamics best-response potential games Economics and Econometrics Class (set theory) Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory Logit Combinatorial game theory jel:D83 2002 Economics and Econometrics symbols.namesake 10007 Department of Economics 0502 economics and business Convergence (routing) Economics ddc:330 050207 economics 050205 econometrics best-response potential games 05 social sciences jel:C72 Learning in games 330 Economics Equilibrium selection Nash equilibrium 2003 Finance Best response symbols Mathematical economics Game theory Finance |
| Popis: | We develop a characterization of stochastically stable states for the logit-response learning dynamics in games, with arbitrary specification of revision opportunities. The result allows us to show convergence to the set of Nash equilibria in the class of best-response potential games and the failure of the dynamics to select potential maximizers beyond the class of exact potential games. We also study to which extent equilibrium selection is robust to the specification of revision opportunities. Our techniques can be extended and applied to a wide class of learning dynamics in games. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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