Under-reporting of Income and Labor Market Performance

Autor:	Ann-Sofie Kolm, Søren Bo Nielsen
Rok vydání:	2008
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics Labour economics Double taxation Sociology and Political Science media_common.quotation_subject Wage Unemployment matching wage bargaining tax evasion Tax reform jel:J64 jel:J41 jel:H26 Value-added tax Ad valorem tax Tax credit Economics Finance Indirect tax media_common
Zdroj:	Journal of Public Economic Theory. 10:195-217
ISSN:	1467-9779 1097-3923
DOI:	10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00358.x
Popis:	To examine the effects on labor market performance of government tax and enforcement policies, this paper develops an equilibrium model featuring tax evasion, matching frictions, and worker-firm wage bargains. In the wage bargains, workers and firms can agree on the amount of remuneration that should not be reported to the tax authorities. We find that increased taxation actually reduces unemployment, whereas more zealous enforcement has the opposite effect.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::bb34a4df1b0dc0cd205cfd2260b781a6 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00358.x Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF