Legal efficiency and consistency
| Autor: | Alessandro Riboni, Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Riboni, Alessandro, Felli, L [0000-0001-6113-6014], Apollo - University of Cambridge Repository |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
media_common.quotation_subject Common law 05 social sciences Social Welfare Time-Inconsistency Legal adaptability Statute Property right protection Consistency (negotiation) Property rights 0502 economics and business Civil law (legal system) Economics Property right protection Legal origin Time-Inconsistency Investment Legal adaptability Legal origin 050207 economics Investment Enforcement Welfare Finance 050205 econometrics Law and economics media_common |
| Popis: | © 2019 Elsevier B.V. We analyze the efficiency and consistency of court decisions under common and civil law. As a leading example, we study the enforcement of property rights. Judges are of two types: some are conservative and follow the precedent or the statute, while others maximize social welfare. When courts intervene ex-post, after the relevant economic choices have been made, welfare-maximizing courts face a “commitment problem.” Such an ex-post bias has implications on the relative “consistency” and efficiency of each legal system. Surprisingly, we find that court decisions are more consistent under common law than under civil law. The welfare comparison between the two systems is, instead, ambiguous. However, in changing economic environments, common law is more likely to dominate civil law because of its greater adaptability. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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