Malleable Lies: Communication and Cooperation in a High Stakes TV Game Show
| Autor: | Uyanga Turmunkh, Dennie van Dolder, Martijn J. van den Assem |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Lille économie management - UMR 9221 (LEM), Université d'Artois (UA)-Université catholique de Lille (UCL)-Université de Lille-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University of Nottingham, UK (UON), Finance, Tinbergen Institute |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Deception
Strategy and Management media_common.quotation_subject Management Science and Operations Research Prisoner’s dilemma [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences Lying aversion Cheap talk SDG 17 - Partnerships for the Goals Malleability 0502 economics and business Credibility 050207 economics Positive economics media_common 050208 finance Communication 05 social sciences Conditionality Prisoner's dilemma 16. Peace & justice [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance Dilemma Cooperation Game show Psychology Social psychology Lying |
| Zdroj: | Management Science Management Science, INFORMS, 2019, 65 (10), ⟨10.1287/mnsc.2018.3159⟩ Management Science, 65(10), 4795-4812. INFORMS Inst.for Operations Res.and the Management Sciences Management Science, 2019, 65 (10), ⟨10.1287/mnsc.2018.3159⟩ Turmunkh, U, Van den Assem, M J & Van Dolder, D 2019, ' Malleable Lies : Communication and Cooperation in a High Stakes TV Game Show ', Management Science, vol. 65, no. 10, pp. 4795-4812 . https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3159 |
| ISSN: | 0025-1909 1526-5501 |
| DOI: | 10.1287/mnsc.2018.3159⟩ |
| Popis: | We investigate the credibility of nonbinding preplay statements about cooperative behavior, using data from a high-stakes TV game show in which contestants play a variant on the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma. We depart from the conventional binary approach of classifying statements as promises or not, and propose a more fine-grained two-by-two typology inspired by the idea that lying aversion leads defectors to prefer statements that are malleable to ex-post interpretation as truths. Our empirical analysis shows that statements that carry an element of conditionality or implicitness are associated with a lower likelihood of cooperation, and confirms that malleability is a good criterion for judging the credibility of cheap talk. This paper was accepted by Elke Weber, judgment and decision making. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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