Strong Nash equilibria and mixed strategies
| Autor: | Roberto Lucchetti, Eleonora Braggion, Nicola Gatti, Tuomas Sandholm, Bernhard von Stengel |
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| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
Statistics and Probability Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory Economics and Econometrics Pareto efficiency Outcome (game theory) Noncooperative games Null set symbols.namesake Mathematics (miscellaneous) Strategy Strong Nash equilibrium Economics QA Mathematics Stochastic game ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING Pareto principle TheoryofComputation_GENERAL Mixed strategies Nash equilibrium symbols Statistics Probability and Uncertainty Mathematical economics Social Sciences (miscellaneous) |
| Popis: | We study strong Nash equilibriain mixed strategies in finite games. A Nash equilibrium is strong if no coalition of players can jointly deviate so that all players in the coalition get strictly better payoffs. Our main result concerns games with two players and states that if a game admits a strong Nash equilibrium, then the payoff pairs in the support of the equilibrium lie on a straight line in the players’ utility space. As a consequence, the set of games that have a strong Nash equilibrium in which at least one player plays a mixed strategy has measure zero. We show that the same property holds for games with more than two players, already when no coalition of two players can profitably deviate. Furthermore, we show that, in contrast to games with two players, in a strong Nash equilibrium an outcome that is strictly Pareto dominated may occur with positive probability. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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