When in Rome... on Local Norms and Sentencing Decisions

Autor: Arnaud Philippe, David S. Abrams, Roberto Galbiati, Emeric Henry
Přispěvatelé: University of Pennsylvania [Philadelphia], Département d'économie (Sciences Po) (ECON), Sciences Po (Sciences Po)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), CEPR, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), Université Toulouse 1 Capitole (UT1), Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), ANR-10-LABX-0091,LIEPP,Center for the Interdisciplinary Evaluation of Public Policies(2010), ANR-18-IDEX-0001,Université de Paris,Université de Paris(2018)
Rok vydání: 2019
Předmět:
Zdroj: LIEPP Working Paper
LIEPP Working Paper, Laboratoire interdisciplinaire d’évaluation des politiques publiques (LIEPP, Sciences Po), 2019
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3357122
Popis: We study spatial variation in criminal sentencing. We show the existence of local sentencing practices varying widely even across geographically proximate areas. Using compulsory rotation of judges in North Carolina, we find that judges arriving in a new court gradually converge toward local sentencing practices. We provide evidence that convergence in sentencing corresponds to a process of learning about local practices, which is accelerated by the presence of senior judges in the district, and that these sentencing practices are correlated with local norms of behavior. Finally, we discuss the theoretical implications of these results for the optimal design of judicial systems.
Databáze: OpenAIRE