Capital structure under collusion
| Autor: | Gaizka Ormazabal, Daniel Ferrés, Giorgo Sertsios, Paul Povel |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Market capitalization
040101 forestry Economics and Econometrics 050208 finance Leverage (finance) Capital structure Product market 05 social sciences Cartel 04 agricultural and veterinary sciences Monetary economics Microeconomics Competition (economics) 0502 economics and business Collusion Economics 0401 agriculture forestry and fisheries Profitability index Business Finance |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Financial Intermediation. 45:100854 |
| ISSN: | 1042-9573 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jfi.2020.100854 |
| Popis: | We study the financial leverage of firms that collude by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage ratios during collusion periods, consistent with the idea that reductions in leverage help increase cartel stability. Cartel firms have a surprisingly large economic footprint (they represent more than 20% of the total market capitalization in the U.S.), so understanding their decisions is relevant. Our findings show that anti-competitive behavior has a significant effect on capital structure choices. They also shed new light on the relation between profitability and financial leverage. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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