Great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions
| Autor: | Cathal O'Madagain, Katharina A. Helming, Marco F. H. Schmidt, Eli Shupe, Josep Call, Michael Tomasello |
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| Přispěvatelé: | University of St Andrews. Centre for Social Learning & Cognitive Evolution, University of St Andrews. School of Psychology and Neuroscience |
| Rok vydání: | 2022 |
| Předmět: |
BF Psychology
Pan troglodytes Information-seeking Great-apes BF General Biochemistry Genetics and Molecular Biology Comparative Studies Metacognitive monitoring Reward Psychology Animals Humans Developmental analysis Children General Environmental Science General Immunology and Microbiology DAS Hominidae Reasoning General Medicine Pan paniscus Child Preschool Rational monitoring General Agricultural and Biological Sciences Decision making Decision-making |
| Zdroj: | Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, vol 44, iss 44 |
| ISSN: | 1471-2954 |
| Popis: | Several species can detect when they are uncertain about what decision to make –revealed by opting out of the choice, or by seeking more information before deciding. But we do not know whether any nonhuman animals recognize when they need more information to make a decision because new evidence contradicts an already-formed belief. Here we explore this ability in great apes and human children. First, we show that after great apes saw new evidence contradicting a prior belief about which of two rewards was greater, they stopped to look for more information before deciding. They did not just register their own uncertainty, but attempted to resolve the contradiction between their belief and the new evidence, indicating rational monitoring of the decision-making process. Children did the same at five years of age, but not at three. In a second study, participants formed a belief about a reward’s location, but then a social partner contradicted them, by picking the opposite location. This time even three-year old children looked for more information, while apes ignored the disagreement. While apes were sensitive only to the conflict in physical evidence, the youngest children were more sensitive to peer disagreement than conflicting physical evidence. Postprint |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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