The Political Cost of Corruption: Scandals, Campaign Finance, and Reelection in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies
| Autor: | Lucio Rennó, Marcus André Melo, Ivan Chaves Jucá |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
Latin Americans
Sociology and Political Science Korruption Chamber of Deputies corruption costs Public administration Sociology & anthropology Criminal Sociology Sociology of Law Brasilien 050602 political science & public administration Economics 050207 economics Political science media_common 05 social sciences 0506 political science Kosten politische Kriminalität Accountability ddc:301 political criminality Brazil reelection Corruption media_common.quotation_subject Politikwissenschaft Political Science election lcsh:Political science Wahl Campaign finance 1995 to 2010 Politics Carry (investment) legislators 0502 economics and business Legislative Studies Comparative Politics Finanzierung Political Process Elections Political Sociology Political Culture politische Willensbildung politische Soziologie politische Kultur funding Südamerika South America election advertising scandals Lateinamerika Latin America accountability Soziologie Anthropologie Political economy Political Science and International Relations ddc:320 Kriminalsoziologie Rechtssoziologie Kriminologie Normative Wahlwerbung lcsh:J |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Politics in Latin America, Vol 8, Iss 2 (2016) Journal of Politics in Latin America |
| ISSN: | 1868-4890 |
| Popis: | Políticos notoriamente envolvidos em escândalos de corrupção logram reelegerse apesar da opinião pública em geral condenar a corrupção. Nesse artigo nos debruçamos sobre esse paradoxo examinando o efeito de escândalos de corrupção no comportamento de membros da Câmara dos Deputados. Em particular, focamos em suas estratégias de financiamento de campanha e escolhas de carreira. Para explorar esses temas utilizamos um banco de dados original que contém informações sobre todos os deputados e deputadas federais de 1995 a 2010. Embora muitos parlamentares acusados de corrupção sejam penalizados nas urnas, mostramos que gastos de campanha elevados atenuam o efeito negativo de escândalos. Nossos resultados são robustos para várias especificações e controlando por explicações alternativas. Este artigo apresenta uma discussão original das estratégias utilizadas por políticos corruptos para se manterem no poder. Mostramos que se tornam imunes às consequências eleitorais de escândalos se gastarem acima de patamares específicos. Esses achados são muito relevantes para discussões normativas em termos de reforma política que visam fortalecer accountability eleitoral no Brazil. While corruption is widely disapproved of, some corrupt politicians continue to win elections. We tackle this paradox by examining the effects of malfeasance scandals in politicians' behavior. In particular, we focus on their campaign finance strategies and career choices. We explore these issues empirically with an original dataset that includes all lower-house members of Congress (MCs) in Brazil from 1995 to 2010. Although tainted incumbents tend to be penalized electorally, we show that campaign spending attenuates this effect. These results are robust, controlling for a host of potential confounders and biases. Hence, we offer a first exploration of incumbents' strategies to avoid the electoral cost of their publicized wrongdoings. Above a certain threshold of funding, Brazilian members of Congress become impervious to negative exposure, regardless of the severity of their ethical and/or criminal violations. These results carry important normative consequences in terms of regulating campaign financing as a means of improving accountability. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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