Interventionism and Non-Causal Dependence Relations: New Work for a Theory of Supervenience
| Autor: | Vera Hoffmann-Kolss |
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| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 100:679-694 |
| ISSN: | 1471-6828 0004-8402 |
| DOI: | 10.1080/00048402.2021.1941154 |
| Popis: | Causes must be distinct from their effects. If the temperature in a room is 15°F, this can cause water pipes to freeze. However, the temperature’s being 15°F is not a cause of the temperature’s being below the freezing point. In general, conceptual, logical, mathematical, and other non-causal dependence relations should not be misclassified as causal. In this paper, I discuss how interventionist theories of causation can meet the challenge of distinguishing between (direct or indirect) causal relations and dependence relations that are due to non-causal factors. I survey several approaches to solving this problem, and propose a novel criterion based on the notion of supervenience. According to this criterion, variables are sufficiently distinct to qualify as the relata of a causal relation iff they do not have overlapping minimal supervenience bases. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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