How big is the 'lemons' problem? Historical evidence from French wines
Autor: | Emmanuel Paroissien, Ariel Ortiz-Bobea, Pierre Mérel |
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Přispěvatelé: | University of California [Davis] (UC Davis), University of California, Cornell University College of Veterinary Medicine, State University of New York (SUNY), Alimentation et sciences sociales (ALISS), Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), ANR-11-LABX-0027,RFIEA+,Réseau français des instituts d'études avancées Plus(2011) |
Rok vydání: | 2021 |
Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Adverse selection Welfare Certification JEL: N - Economic History/N.N5 - Agriculture Natural Resources Environment and Extractive Industries/N.N5.N54 - Europe: 1913– [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance Product (business) Information asymmetry Incentive Uncertainty quality JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q1 - Agriculture/Q.Q1.Q18 - Agricultural Policy • Food Policy 0502 economics and business Economics Perfect competition Quality (business) 050207 economics Market value JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information Knowledge and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design Finance Industrial organization 050205 econometrics media_common |
Zdroj: | European Economic Review European Economic Review, Elsevier, 2021, 138, 33 p. ⟨10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103824⟩ |
ISSN: | 0014-2921 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103824 |
Popis: | International audience; This paper provides empirical evidence on the welfare losses associated with asymmetric information about product quality in a competitive market. When consumers cannot observe product characteristics at the time of purchase, atomistic producers have no incentive to supply costly quality. We compare wine prices across administrative districts around the enactment of historic regulations aimed at certifying the quality of more than 250 French appellation wines to identify welfare losses from asymmetric information. We estimate that these losses amount to more than 7% of total market value, suggesting an important role for credible certification schemes. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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