Financial Markets, Industry Dynamics and Growth

Autor: Pietro F. Peretto, Raoul Minetti, Maurizio Iacopetta
Přispěvatelé: Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (OFCE), Sciences Po (Sciences Po), Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) (OFCE), Michigan State University [East Lansing], Michigan State University System, Duke University [Durham], SKEMA Business School, Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion (GREDEG), Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (... - 2019) (UNS), COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) (COMUE UCA)-COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) (COMUE UCA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Côte d'Azur (UCA)
Rok vydání: 2019
Předmět:
Economics and Econometrics
Endogenous growth
Market Structure
Financial Frictions
Corporate Governance
jel:E44
ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING
Growth
Monetary economics
Market Structure
Industry dynamics
endogenous growth
Financial Frictions
Corporate governance
Market structure
jel:O40
Shareholder
0502 economics and business
050207 economics
Industrial organization
Rate of return
JEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance/G.G3.G30 - General
JEL: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E4 - Money and Interest Rates/E.E4.E44 - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
050208 finance
Endogenous growth theory
Short run
Financial markets
05 social sciences
Financial market
jel:G30
Endogenous Growth
Market Structure
Financial Frictions
Corporate Gover- nance
Market concentration
[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
Investment (macroeconomics)
8. Economic growth
Business
JEL: O - Economic Development
Innovation
Technological Change
and Growth/O.O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity/O.O4.O40 - General
Zdroj: Economic Journal, 129(621), 2192-2215 (2019-07)
The Economic Journal
The Economic Journal, In press, ⟨10.1111/ecoj.12635⟩
Economic Journal
Economic Journal, Wiley, 2019, 129 (621), pp.2192-2215. ⟨10.1111/ecoj.12635⟩
ISSN: 1468-0297
0013-0133
DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12635
Popis: We study the impact of corporate governance frictions in an economy where growth is driven both by the foundation of new firms and by the in-house investment of incumbent firms. Firms' managers engage in tunneling and empire building activities. Active shareholders monitor man- agers, but can shirk on their monitoring, to the detriment of minority (passive) shareholders. The analysis reveals that these confiicts among firms' stakeholders inhibit the entry of new firms, thereby increasing market concentration. Despite depressing investment returns in the short run, the frictions can however lead incumbents to invest more aggressively in the long run to exploit the concentrated market structure. By means of quantitative analysis, we characterize conditions under which corporate governance reforms boost or reduce welfare.
Databáze: OpenAIRE
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