The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard
| Autor: | Eric Budish, Estelle Cantillon |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2012 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Inequality media_common.quotation_subject course allocation dictatorship ex-ante efficiency ex-post efficiency field data market design multi-unit assignment random serial dictatorship strategic behaviour strategyproofness Economic Justice jel:D02 Microeconomics Phenomenon 0502 economics and business Economics 050207 economics 050205 econometrics TRACE (psycholinguistics) media_common jel:C93 Multi-unit assignment 05 social sciences Equity (finance) jel:C78 16. Peace & justice Economie Assignment problem Welfare Mechanism (sociology) |
| Zdroj: | American Economic Review The American economic review, 102 (5 |
| DOI: | 10.1257/aer.102.5.2237 |
| Popis: | This paper uses data consisting of students' strategically reported preferences and their underlying true preferences to study the course allocation mechanism used at Harvard Business School. We show that the mechanism is manipulable in theory, manipulated in practice, and that these manipulations cause meaningful welfare losses. However, we also find that ex-ante welfare is higher than under the strategyproof and ex-post efficient alternative, the Random Serial Dictatorship. We trace the poor ex-ante performance of RSD to a phenomenon specific to multi-unit assignment, "callousness'. We draw lessons for the design of multi-unit assignment mechanisms and for market design more broadly. info:eu-repo/semantics/published |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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