Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition
| Autor: | Maria Romaniello, Maria Gabriella Graziano |
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| Přispěvatelé: | Graziano, MARIA GABRIELLA, Romaniello, M., Graziano, M. G., Romaniello, Maria |
| Rok vydání: | 2011 |
| Předmět: |
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
Economics and Econometrics jel:D51 Total cost jel:D60 Veto TheoryofComputation_GENERAL jel:H41 Public good Grand coalition Cost share Private good Microeconomics Public project cost share equilibrium core non-dominated allocation grand coalition Economics Mathematical economics Equivalence (measure theory) Social Sciences (miscellaneous) Public finance |
| Zdroj: | Social Choice and Welfare. 38:269-303 |
| ISSN: | 1432-217X 0176-1714 |
| Popis: | We consider pure exchange economies with finitely many private goods involving the choice of a public project. We discuss core-equivalence results in the general framework of non-Euclidean representation of the collective goods. We define a contribution scheme to capture the fraction of the total cost of providing the project that each blocking coalition is expected to cover. We show that for each given contribution scheme defined over the wider class of Aubin coalitions, the resulting core is equivalent to the corresponding linear cost share equilibria. We also characterize linear cost share equilibria in terms of the veto power of the grand coalition. It turns out that linear cost share equilibria are exactly those allocations that cannot be blocked by the grand coalition with reference to auxiliary economies with the same space of agents and modified initial endowments and cost functions. Unlike the Aubin-type equivalence and results presented in Diamantaras and Gilles (Soc Choice Welf 15:121–139, 1998), this characterization does not depend on a particular contribution scheme. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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