Partially informed agents can form a swarm in a nash equilibrium
| Autor: | Aykut Yildiz, A.B. Ozguler |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2015 |
| Předmět: |
Mathematical optimization
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory Dynamic multi-agent systems Computer science Foraging Swarming (honey bee) MathematicsofComputing_NUMERICALANALYSIS ComputingMethodologies_ARTIFICIALINTELLIGENCE Nash equilibrium Social foraging symbols.namesake Differential game Electrical and Electronic Engineering Normal-form game Swarm behaviour Computer Science Applications Computer Science::Multiagent Systems Control and Systems Engineering Swarming behavior Best response symbols Dynamic game theory Mathematical economics Finite horizon Artificial potentials |
| Zdroj: | IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control |
| Popis: | Foraging swarms in one-dimensional motion with incomplete position information are studied in the context of a noncooperative differential game. In this game, the swarming individuals act with partial information as it is assumed that each agent knows the positions of only the adjacent ones. It is shown that a Nash equilibrium solution that exhibits many features of a foraging swarm such as movement coordination, self-organization, stability, and formation control exists. © 1963-2012 IEEE. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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