General equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery

Autor: João Correia-da-Silva, Carlos Hervés-Beloso
Přispěvatelé: Faculdade de Economia
Rok vydání: 2011
Předmět:
Zdroj: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP)
instacron:RCAAP
ISSN: 1432-0479
0938-2259
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0647-1
Popis: We consider a general equilibrium model of trade ex ante with differential information in which agents choose plans of state-contingent lists of bundles. Being unable to verify that the state of nature is s and not t, an agent has to accept the delivery of any bundle in the list for delivery in state s or in the list for delivery in state t. Under the assumption that each state of nature can be verified by at least one agent, we establish existence of equilibrium and we show that the equilibrium allocation satisfies a notion of coalitional incentive compatibility.
Databáze: OpenAIRE