General equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery
Autor: | João Correia-da-Silva, Carlos Hervés-Beloso |
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Přispěvatelé: | Faculdade de Economia |
Rok vydání: | 2011 |
Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Ex-ante General equilibrium theory TheoryofComputation_GENERAL Economia e gestão [Ciências sociais] State (functional analysis) Economics and Business [Social sciences] Rational behavior Computer Science::Multiagent Systems Differential information Economia e gestão Economics and Business Incentive compatibility Bundle Economics Mathematical economics Public finance |
Zdroj: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP) instacron:RCAAP |
ISSN: | 1432-0479 0938-2259 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s00199-011-0647-1 |
Popis: | We consider a general equilibrium model of trade ex ante with differential information in which agents choose plans of state-contingent lists of bundles. Being unable to verify that the state of nature is s and not t, an agent has to accept the delivery of any bundle in the list for delivery in state s or in the list for delivery in state t. Under the assumption that each state of nature can be verified by at least one agent, we establish existence of equilibrium and we show that the equilibrium allocation satisfies a notion of coalitional incentive compatibility. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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