Strategy-proofness on Euclidean spaces
| Autor: | Ton Storcken, Hans van der Stel, Hans Peters, W. Peremans |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 1997 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory Euclidean space media_common.quotation_subject Monotonic function Outcome (probability) law.invention Separable space Combinatorics Computer Science::Multiagent Systems Range (mathematics) law Voting Euclidean geometry Cartesian coordinate system Mathematical economics Social Sciences (miscellaneous) Mathematics media_common |
| Zdroj: | Social Choice and Welfare, 14, 379-401. Springer |
| ISSN: | 0176-1714 |
| Popis: | In this paper we characterize strategy-proof voting schemes on Euclidean spaces. A voting scheme is strategy-proof whenever it is optimal for every agent to report his best alternative. Here the individual preferences underlying these best choices are separable and quadratic. It turns out that a voting scheme is strategy-proof if and only if (a) its range is a closed Cartesian subset of Euclidean space, (ß) the outcomes are at a minimal distance to the outcome under a specific coordinatewise veto voting scheme, and (¿) it satisfies some monotonicity properties. Neither continuity nor decomposability is implied by strategy-proofness, but these are satisfied if we additionally impose Pareto-optimality or unanimity. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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