Social capital dynamics and collective action: the role of subjective satisfaction in a common pool resource experiment
| Autor: | Leonardo Becchetti, Pierluigi Conzo, Stefano Castriota |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2015 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Development public good games Collective action trust games randomized experiment social capital subjective wellbeing Grassroots Dictator game 0502 economics and business Economics 050207 economics Settore SECS-P/01 - Economia Politica 050205 econometrics General Environmental Science Public economics business.industry 05 social sciences Public good Public relations Common-pool resource Predictive power business Commons Social capital |
| Zdroj: | Environment and Development Economics. 21:512-531 |
| ISSN: | 1469-4395 1355-770X |
| Popis: | In low-income countries, grassroots collective action for the management of a common environmental resource is a well-known substitute for government provision of public goods. In our research we test experimentally what its effect is on social capital. To this purpose we structure a ‘sandwich’ experiment in which participants play a common pool resource game (CPRG) between two trust games in a Nairobi slum where social capital is scarce but informal rules regulating the commons are abundant. Our findings show that the change in trustworthiness between the two trust game rounds generated by the CPRG experience is crucially affected by the subjective satisfaction about the CPRG, rather than by standard objective measures related to CPRG players' behaviour. These results highlight that subjective satisfaction in a collective action has relevant predictive power on social capital creation, providing information which can be crucial to designing successful self-organized environmental resource regimes. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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