Carry a big stick, or no stick at all
| Autor: | Gonzalo Olcina, Vicente Calabuig, Enrique Fatas, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
Reciprocity (social and political philosophy)
Economics and Econometrics Punishment (psychology) Sociology and Political Science Endowment 05 social sciences Experimental economics Social preferences Microeconomics Dictator game 0502 economics and business Economics Deterrence (legal) 050207 economics Applied Psychology 050205 econometrics Inequity aversion |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Economic Psychology. 57:153-171 |
| ISSN: | 0167-4870 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.joep.2016.09.006 |
| Popis: | We investigate the effect of costly punishment in a trust game with endowment heterogeneity. Our findings indicate that the difference between the investor and the allocator’s initial endowments determines the effect of punishment on trust and trustworthiness. Punishment fosters trust only when the investor is wealthier than the allocator. Otherwise, punishment fails to promote trusting behavior. As for trustworthiness, the effect is just the opposite. The higher the difference between the investor and the allocator’s initial endowments, the less willing allocators are to pay back. We discuss the consistency of our findings with social preference models (like inequality aversion, reciprocity), the capacity of punishment (i.e., the deterrence hypothesis) and hidden costs of punishment (i.e., models of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation). Our results are hardly coherent with the first two (inequality aversion and deterrence), but roughly consistent with the latter. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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