Physical Layer Secret Key Generation in Static Environments
| Autor: | Nasser Aldaghri, Hessam Mahdavifar |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
FOS: Computer and information sciences
021110 strategic defence & security studies Key generation Theoretical computer science Computer Networks and Communications Computer science business.industry Information Theory (cs.IT) Computer Science - Information Theory 0211 other engineering and technologies Eavesdropping Data_CODINGANDINFORMATIONTHEORY 02 engineering and technology Encryption Alice and Bob Information leakage Safety Risk Reliability and Quality business Semantic security Randomness Communication channel |
| Zdroj: | IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security. 15:2692-2705 |
| ISSN: | 1556-6021 1556-6013 |
| DOI: | 10.1109/tifs.2020.2974621 |
| Popis: | Two legitimate parties, referred to as Alice and Bob, wish to generate secret keys from the wireless channel in the presence of an eavesdropper, referred to as Eve, in order to use such keys for encryption and decryption. In general, the secret key rate highly depends on the coherence time of the channel. In particular, a straightforward method of generating secret keys in static environments results in ultra-low rates. In order to resolve this problem, we introduce a low-complexity method called induced randomness. In this method, Alice and Bob independently generate local randomness to be used together with the uniqueness of the wireless channel coefficients in order to enable high-rate secret key generation. In this work, two scenarios are considered: first, when Alice and Bob share a direct communication channel, and second, when Alice and Bob do not have a direct link and communicate through an untrusted relay. After exchanging the induced randomness, post-processing is done by Alice and Bob to generate highly-correlated samples that are used for the key generation. Such samples are then converted into bits, disparities between the sequences generated by Alice and Bob are mitigated, and the resulting sequences are then hashed to compensate for the information leakage to the eavesdropper and to allow consistency checking of the generated key bit sequences. We utilize semantic security measures and information-theoretic inequalities to upper bound the probability of successful eavesdropping attack in terms of the mutual information measures that can be numerically computed. Given certain reasonable system parameters this bound is numerically evaluated to be $2^{-31}$ and $2^{-10.57}$ in the first and the second scenario, respectively. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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