A reply to Ponte et al (2016) Supply chain collaboration: Some comments on the nucleolus of the beer game

Autor: David Mueller
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2018
Předmět:
lcsh:T55.4-60.8
Computer science
Strategy and Management
media_common.quotation_subject
Logística (Indústria)
Supply chain collaboration
Monotonic function
010501 environmental sciences
lcsh:Business
01 natural sciences
beer game
cooperative game theory
profit allocation
nucleolus
Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
lcsh:Social Sciences
Profit sharing
Business logistics
Originality
0502 economics and business
ddc:650
profit allocation
lcsh:Industrial engineering. Management engineering
Shapley value
nucleolus
Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs [Àrees temàtiques de la UPC]
Cooperative games (Mathematics)
0105 earth and related environmental sciences
media_common
aggregate monotonicity
Lorenz set
lcsh:Commerce
05 social sciences
Cooperative game theory
Lexicographical order
lcsh:H
Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
lcsh:HF1-6182
Dominance (economics)
beer game
050206 economic theory
core-selection
Economia i organització d'empreses::Direcció d'operacions::Modelització de transports i logística [Àrees temàtiques de la UPC]
lcsh:HF5001-6182
Mathematical economics
cooperative game theory
Zdroj: Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management, Vol 11, Iss 3, Pp 528-534 (2018)
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management; 2018: Vol.: 11 Núm.: 3
UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC)
ISSN: 2013-0953
2013-8423
Popis: Purpose: The aim of the paper is to pick up the result of a previously published paper in order to deepen the discussion. We analyze the solution against the background of some well-known concepts and we introduce a newer one. In doing so we would like to inspire the further discussion of supply chain collaboration. Design/methodology/approach: Based on game theoretical knowledge we present and compare seven properties of fair profit sharing. Findings: We show that the nucleolus is a core-solution, which does not fulfil aggregate monotonicity. In contrast the Shapley value is an aggregate monotonic solution but does not belong to the core of every cooperative game. Moreover, we present the Lorenz dominance as an additional fairness criteria. Originality/value: We discuss the very involved procedure of establishing lexicographic orders of excess vectors for games with many players.
Databáze: OpenAIRE
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