Adoption incentives and environmental policy timing under asymmetric information and strategic firm behaviour
| Autor: | Alessio D'Amato, Bouwe R. Dijkstra |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Conventional wisdom Management Monitoring Policy and Law Settore SECS-P/02 - Politica Economica Asymmetric information Commitment Rime consistency Emission taxation Quotas Microeconomics Information asymmetry Incentive Time consistency 0502 economics and business Damages Economics 050202 agricultural economics & policy Environmental policy 050207 economics Welfare media_common Social policy |
| Zdroj: | Environmental Economics and Policy Studies. 20:125-155 |
| ISSN: | 1867-383X 1432-847X |
| Popis: | We consider the incentives of a single firm to invest in a cleaner technology under emission quotas and emission taxation. We assume asymmetric information about the firm's cost of employing the new technology. Policy is set either before the firm invests (commitment) or after (time consistency). Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that with commitment (time consistency), quotas give higher (lower) investment incentives than taxes. With quotas (taxes), commitment generally leads to higher (lower) welfare than time consistency. Under commitment with quadratic abatement costs and environmental damages, a modified Weitzman rule applies and quotas usually lead to higher welfare than taxes. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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