Why I Should Still Offset Rather Than Do More Good

Autor:	Kritika Maheshwari
Přispěvatelé:	Faculty of Philosophy, Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy
Rok vydání:	2022
Předmět:	Philosophy climate change offsetting Geography Planning and Development Management Monitoring Policy and Law John Broome duties risk
Zdroj:	Ethics, Policy and Environment, 25(3), 249-252
ISSN:	2155-0093 2155-0085
DOI:	10.1080/21550085.2022.2104091
Popis:	Stefansson (forthcoming) argues that by emitting and offsetting, we fail to fulfil our justice-based duty to avoid harm owed to specific individuals. In this paper, I explore a case where offsetting fails to prevent some but not all risks of harms that our emissions impose on them. By drawing on a distinction between general and specific duties not to (risk) harm, I argue that if by emitting and offsetting, we satisfy some (if not all) of our specific duties we owe others, then this gives us stronger moral reasons to offset than give to charities that do good more effectively.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ae68a85730ea4c57f6e1a00f41a0d993 https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2022.2104091 Zobrazit plný text záznamu