Actualism Doesn’t Have Control Issues: A Reply to Cohen and Timmerman
| Autor: | Andrew T. Forcehimes, Luke Semrau |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | School of Humanities |
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
Philosophy of mind
Philosophy of science Possibilism Counterfactual conditional Social philosophy Philosophy 05 social sciences 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion 050105 experimental psychology Epistemology Philosophy of language Humanities::Philosophy [DRNTU] Actualism Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics 060302 philosophy Consequentialism 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Control (linguistics) |
| Zdroj: | Philosophia. 47:271-277 |
| ISSN: | 1574-9274 0048-3893 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11406-018-9957-x |
| Popis: | Recently, Cohen and Timmerman (Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, 10(3), 1–18, 2016) argue that actualism has control issues. The view should be rejected, they claim, as it recognizes a morally irrelevant distinction between counterfactuals over which agents exercise the same kind of control. Here we reply on behalf of actualism. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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