Buying spatially-coordinated ecosystem services: An experiment on the role of auction format and communication

Autor: Nick Hanley, Anna Bartczak, Michal Krawczyk, Anne Stenger
Přispěvatelé: Warsaw Ecological Economics Center, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw (UW), Department of Geography and Sustainable Development, University of St Andrews [Scotland], Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière (LEF), AgroParisTech-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), Université de Lorraine (UL)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), NEWFOREX project (New Ways to Value and Market Forest Externalities, FP7-KBBE-2009-3, Project no. 243950), University of St Andrews. Geography & Sustainable Development, University of Warsaw, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-AgroParisTech
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2016
Předmět:
JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C92 - Laboratory
Group Behavior
Economics and Econometrics
Provision of ecosystem services
[SDV]Life Sciences [q-bio]
NDAS
010501 environmental sciences
Wildlife corridor
Biodiversity conservation
01 natural sciences
Ecosystem services
chat in experiments
0502 economics and business
spatial coordination
Economics
Production (economics)
Discriminatory and uniform auctions
provision of ecosystem services
JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q58 - Government Policy
0105 earth and related environmental sciences
General Environmental Science
discriminatory and uniform auctions
Government
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure
Pricing
and Design/D.D4.D44 - Auctions
GE
Public economics
Conservation auctions
05 social sciences
conservation auctions
15. Life on land
Environmental economics
[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q57 - Ecological Economics: Ecosystem Services • Biodiversity Conservation • Bioeconomics • Industrial Ecology
Chat in experiments
JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation/Q.Q2.Q23 - Forestry
Value (economics)
Collusion
Liberian dollar
050202 agricultural economics & policy
biodiversity conservation
Spatial coordination
Construct (philosophy)
GE Environmental Sciences
Zdroj: Ecological Economics
Ecological Economics, Elsevier, 2016, 124, pp.36-48. ⟨10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.01.012⟩
ISSN: 0921-8009
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.01.012⟩
Popis: The study was carried out as a part of the NEWFOREX project (New Ways to Value and Market Forest Externalities, FP7-KBBE-2009-3, Project no. 243950). It was also supported by the French National Research Agency (ANR) as part of the "Investissements d’Avenir" program (ANR-11-LABX-0002-01, Lab of Excellence ARBRE). Procurement auctions are one of several policy tools available to incentivise the provision of ecosystem services and biodiversity conservation. Successful biodiversity conservation often requires a landscape-scale approach and the spatial coordination of participation, for example in the creation of wildlife corridors. In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to explore two features of procurement auctions in a forest landscape: the pricing mechanism (uniform vs. discriminatory) and availability of communication (chat) between potential sellers. We modify the experimental design developed by Reeson et al. (2011) by introducing uncertainty (and hence heterogeneity) in the production value of forest sites as well as an automated, endogenous stopping rule. We find that discriminatory pricing yields to greater environmental benefits per government dollar spent, chiefly because it is easier to construct long corridors. Chat also facilitates such coordination but also seems to encourage collusion in sustaining high prices for the most environmentally attractive plots. These two effects offset each other, making chat neutral from the viewpoint of maximizing environmental effect per dollar spent. Postprint
Databáze: OpenAIRE
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