Investigating Rewards and Deposit Contract Financial Incentives for Physical Activity Behavior Change Using a Smartphone App: Randomized Controlled Trial
| Autor: | David R de Buisonjé, Thomas Reijnders, Talia R Cohen Rodrigues, Santhanam Prabhakaran, Tobias Kowatsch, Stefan A Lipman, Tammo H A Bijmolt, Linda D Breeman, Veronica R Janssen, Roderik A Kraaijenhagen, Hareld M C Kemps, Andrea W M Evers |
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| Přispěvatelé: | University of Zurich, de Buisonjé, David R, Health Economics (HE), Child and Adolescent Psychiatry / Psychology, Research Programme Marketing |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2022 |
| Předmět: |
Adult
behavior change reward learning deposit contracts financial incentives 11549 Institute of Implementation Science in Health Care physical activity computer science 610 Medicine & health Health Informatics behavioral science Motor Activity Young Adult Reward rewards Humans Exercise 2718 Health Informatics eHealth Rewards Financial incentives commitment contracts mobile phone Motivation health sciences information management Mobile Applications social sciences |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Medical Internet Research, 24(10):e38339. Journal of medical Internet Research Journal of Medical Internet Research, 24(10):e38339. JMIR Publications Inc. Journal of Medical Internet Research, 24(10):e38339. JMIR PUBLICATIONS, INC Journal of Medical Internet Research, 24 (10) |
| ISSN: | 1438-8871 1439-4456 |
| DOI: | 10.5167/uzh-226728 |
| Popis: | Background: Financial incentive interventions for improving physical activity have proven to be effective but costly. Deposit contracts (in which participants pledge their own money) could be an affordable alternative. In addition, deposit contracts may have superior effects by exploiting the power of loss aversion. Previous research has often operationalized deposit contracts through loss framing a financial reward (without requiring a deposit) to mimic the feelings of loss involved in a deposit contract. Objective: This study aimed to disentangle the effects of incurring actual losses (through self-funding a deposit contract) and loss framing. We investigated whether incentive conditions are more effective than a no-incentive control condition, whether deposit contracts have a lower uptake than financial rewards, whether deposit contracts are more effective than financial rewards, and whether loss frames are more effective than gain frames. Methods: Healthy participants (N=126) with an average age of 22.7 (SD 2.84) years participated in a 20-day physical activity intervention. They downloaded a smartphone app that provided them with a personalized physical activity goal and either required a €10 (at the time of writing: €1=US $0.98) deposit up front (which could be lost) or provided €10 as a reward, contingent on performance. Daily feedback on incentive earnings was provided and framed as either a loss or gain. We used a 2 (incentive type: deposit or reward) × 2 (feedback frame: gain or loss) between-subjects factorial design with a no-incentive control condition. Our primary outcome was the number of days participants achieved their goals. The uptake of the intervention was a secondary outcome. Results: Overall, financial incentive conditions (mean 13.10, SD 6.33 days goal achieved) had higher effectiveness than the control condition (mean 8.00, SD 5.65 days goal achieved; P=.002; ηp2=0.147). Deposit contracts had lower uptake (29/47, 62%) than rewards (50/50, 100%; P Journal of Medical Internet Research, 24 (10) ISSN:1438-8871 |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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