Understanding sellers’ agents in the residential property market
Autor: | Ka Shing Cheung, Chuyi Xiong |
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Jazyk: | angličtina |
Rok vydání: | 2021 |
Předmět: |
time on the market
Strategy and Management 0211 other engineering and technologies sellers’ agents Price premium 02 engineering and technology Microeconomics search theory online listing 0502 economics and business Agency (sociology) Management. Industrial management 050208 finance 05 social sciences Residential property TheoryofComputation_GENERAL 021107 urban & regional planning HD28-70 overpricing Property market Search theory HG1-9999 ComputingMilieux_COMPUTERSANDSOCIETY Critical test Business second-hand real estate market Transaction data Database transaction Finance |
Zdroj: | International Journal of Strategic Property Management, Vol 25, Iss 3, Pp 179-189 (2021) International Journal of Strategic Property Management; Vol 25 No 3 (2021); 179-189 |
ISSN: | 1648-9179 1648-715X |
Popis: | Buyers in the property market often use an agent who is employed by the seller to assist their home searches. This unique and widely used agency arrangement in the property market is known as “sellers’ agents”. While principal-agent theory advocates that buyers should directly hire their agents (i.e., buyers’ agents) to do the home-hunting, search theory however implies that sellers would employ their agents (i.e., sellers’ agents) to increase the probability of the sale and selling prices. Although sellers’ agents and buyers’ agents are two very distinct institutions, many previous studies assume that their agency characteristics are identical and provide limited insights on how such a seemingly subtle but crucial agency arrangement affects transaction outcomes. Using transaction data from Wuhan China, this study disentangles the effects of the buyers’ and sellers’ agents on properties’ selling prices and their time on the market. The findings indicate that on average transactions conducted by sellers’ agents will be associated with a significant selling price premium of around 3.4%. As a critical test, we further show that the transactions completed by sellers’ agents with selling price premiums will have a shorter marketing time than those completed by buyers’ agents. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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