Managerial Accountability Under Yardstick Competition
| Autor: | Giorgos Stamatopoulos, Michele G. Giuranno, Marcella Scrimitore |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Giuranno, Michele, Scrimitore, Marcella, Stamatopoulos, Giorgos |
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
media_common.quotation_subject
05 social sciences Managerial accountability Counterintuitive rent seeking Tullock context success function Competition (economics) Yardstick Managerial discretion 0502 economics and business Accountability Business 050207 economics Distortion (economics) managerial discretion General Economics Econometrics and Finance Rent-seeking Industrial organization 050205 econometrics media_common |
| Zdroj: | SSRN Electronic Journal. |
| ISSN: | 1556-5068 |
| DOI: | 10.2139/ssrn.3356311 |
| Popis: | Two well-known mechanisms for enhancing managers’ accountability are yardstick competition and internal monitoring. Yardstick competition puts managers in direct competition when firms make decisions for re-appointment. Monitoring is used by firms to detect managers’ rent-seeking activities. While common wisdom suggests that the joint use of the two means would reinforce each other in promoting managers good practices, we find that their interplay distorts managers’ behavior who may end up acting in a less accountable way. Furthermore, differences in monitoring across firms bias that distortion, yielding even more counterintuitive results. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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