Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice
| Autor: | Jean-Robert Tyran, Lydia Mechtenberg |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
InformationSystems_INFORMATIONSYSTEMSAPPLICATIONS media_common.quotation_subject Yield (finance) 05 social sciences Hardware_PERFORMANCEANDRELIABILITY Democracy Microeconomics Information aggregation Voting 0502 economics and business Economics ComputingMilieux_COMPUTERSANDSOCIETY 050206 economic theory Quality (business) Information acquisition Standard theory 050207 economics Competence (human resources) Finance media_common |
| Zdroj: | Games and Economic Behavior. 116:241-259 |
| ISSN: | 0899-8256 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2018.12.002 |
| Popis: | The efficiency of committee voting and referenda with common-interest issues critically depends on voter motivation, i.e., on voters' willingness to cast an informed vote. If voters are motivated, voting may result in smart choices because of information aggregation but if voters remain ignorant, delegating decision making to an expert may yield better outcomes. We experimentally study a common-interest situation in which we vary voters' information cost and the competence of the expert. We find that voters are more motivated to collect information than predicted by standard theory and that voter motivation is higher when subjects demand to make choices by voting than when voting is imposed on subjects. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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